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UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING -
AN ADEQUATE PROGRAM

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PREFACE

There has been a considerable amount of discussion and controversy on the question of adopting a system of universal military training as an integral part of our National Security Program. Although it appears that most Americans favor a program of this type, one has not, as yet, been put into effect. Many Americans are concerned with the financial cost, whether such a program is necessary, and the effects of the interference of education. Still others are concerned with the effects of the training on the nation's youth, the adoption of a false sense of security, the possibility of training without conscription (ROTC, ORC, NG, etc.), and the possibility of our becoming a militaristic nation. The majority seem to have lost sight of the ultimate purpose of a universal military training program, that of providing the necessary military manpower to insure our National Security. For this reason, this monograph was written.

It is believed that a program for universal military training is essential, moreover, this program must not be any "halfway measure" accepted as a solution to the problem. It must include the primary requisites essential for the necessary military manpower. During the present times, arguments which are problematical in nature should be of secondary consideration.

In any such program, certain sacrifices will be necessary, but any sacrifices made now may well save blood and tears later.

INTRODUCTION

George Washington stated many years ago, "If we desire peace, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war".(1) Even in those days it was realized that without some type of military preparedness, our country was risking the peace it so dearly cherishes. Universal military training has been a topic for discussion during each crisis since that time, but as each crisis fades our country again falls into a state of complacency and unpreparedness. Most of this discussion has been about the various systems which should be adopted in order to provide our military manpower. In the present day, however, we must consider a program which provides sufficient military manpower to meet all military threats that face the United States. The situation dictates the maintaining of an instantly ready, highly mobile and thoroughly trained offensive force.(2)

In these days of world turmoil and unrest, no reasonable person can overlook the possibility of our being involved in another great war.(3) The delicate situation in which we are involved in Korea along with the atmosphere in Europe of which we are such an integral part, makes that impossible. Although war is not inevitable, it most certainly is a possibility. Nevertheless, our nation continues to play the part of the turtle in the old story of the race between the rabbit and the turtle. In the past we were always left at the start and

- (1) Army Information Digest, "Estimate of the Situation", p.33, Sep 1947, TIS Library.
- (2) Baldwin, H. W., "The Price of Power", p.154, Harper and Brothers, N. Y., 1947, TIS Library.
- (3) Army, Navy, Air Force Register, "Senate UMF Hearings End", p.1, 23 Feb 1952, TIS Library.

it took a long time to recover. Always, at the outbreak of hostilities, our potentialities were far from developed. Our army was beginning in the process of organizing and, at best, only a very small number of men were fit for actual combat.

As in the case of the rabbit and the turtle though, one more race under similar circumstances may easily produce a different winner. In the event another race took place, it will be necessary to change those circumstances which prevailed heretofore. Our country will have to take steps to be prepared and these steps cannot be halfway measures. Any steps taken toward preparedness must be thorough and complete in order that we may jump off with the starting gun.

Some of the action necessary for complete preparedness has been taken, but none for a sound military manpower program. A sound military manpower program can only be derived from an adequate system of compulsory universal military training. Our country has considered this problem, but, with the controversy and confusion of the past several years, the ultimate purpose of a universal military training program has taken a "back seat". The majority realize the need of some form of program, but, yet, continue to postpone it as long as possible. The many selfish-loved sacrifices and risks involved seem to be the only consideration and have made the real purpose of any program a secondary issue. We must remember, too, that this country not only needs a sound universal military training program for its own protection, but for the security and peace of the entire world.

A program, if adopted, must provide a realistic force which is highly mobile, thoroughly trained and instantly ready to ward off any attempt of aggression. To simply main-

tain a force of trained military manpower is not sufficient. In Europe during the last war for example, every country which was attacked and overrun so easily maintained military manpower prior to the outbreak of hostilities. We need forces, not as those which existed in Europe a few years ago, but forces we know possess the capabilities required in maintaining sound National Security.

DISCUSSION

In our present day, the problems we face are far greater than any of those in the past. There has been rapid development by several nations in the terrible atomic weapons. The value of guided missiles as a weapon of war was realized toward the end of World War II. It, too, has been and is being developed and tested to great lengths. The development of aircraft has been far beyond the expectations of anyone. Their speed combined with long range has opened a serious possible threat. These are only a few of the many advancements made on weapons now available for warfare.

With these new weapons comes for the first time the possibility of a long range aggressor attack. An attack which could start and be carried on inside the continental limits of the United States.(4) Still, some refuse to acknowledge danger and insist we still have nothing to become alarmed about. They feel that in the past we have had our Allies to take the initial brunt of the aggressor attacks and his defensive action has given us the time to ready ourselves for active warfare.(5) This, admittedly, is very true. The "cushion" of time provided by the Allied defensive in Europe in World War II allowed us to divert our limited forces to a limited offensive in the Pacific while all out preparations were being made for a great offensive in both theatres of operation. With the "birth" of long range and terrible weapons this "cushion" of time will no longer be available.

- (4) Army, Navy, Air Force Register, "Military Training Legislation", p.6, 15 Dec 1951, TIS Library.
- (5) Army, Navy, Air Force Register, "UMT Legislation Assured", p.1, 23 Feb 1952, TIS Library.

Any aggressor knows that the United States has been and still is the "heart" of the Allied body of nations. Also, we know that to seriously sever any "heart" can possibly mean death. One thing is certain, the road to recovery would be extremely costly and result in permanent disability. This would not be a new trend in tactics. Many years ago some of the world's greatest tacticians realized the importance of striking at the most vital points. As Karl von Clausewitz, the famed Prussian General stated, "An attack designed to destroy the enemy which has not the boldness to shoot like an arrow directly at the heart of the enemy's power can never hit the mark".(6) Our country cannot overlook the possibility of an aggressor attack designed along these lines.

We have all considered, at one time or other, the possibility of airplanes crossing the Atlantic Ocean or spanning the polar region and releasing atomic bombs on one or more of our larger cities. Now, too, we must consider the possibility of launching atomic guided missiles on our coastal cities. These attacks are far from remote and any of these attacks would have a devastating effect. Any repetition would seriously interfere with any initial plans we may have for mobilizing. Our vast industrial mobilization potentiality may suffer such setbacks that it will not be able to produce effectively. After repeated attacks, attempts to re-establish it will be futile. Without our source of supply, we know from past experience that any attempt we made in retaliation would be hopeless. At this same time, our Allies, who in the past have been so de-

(6) Military Review, "Clausewitz and the Cold War", p.77, Jan 1952, TIS Library.

pendent upon us for logistical support, could be of little or no assistance.

Consider this country at the outbreak of the Korean situation. We were committed to assist in a comparatively limited engagement. Activated divisions had to be reorganized overnight and committed into combat. Although the personnel available were and had been soldiers, many were placed on jobs they knew little or nothing about or had forgotten. There has been two separate occasions where our troops were battered and nearly pushed back into the Sea of Japan. On the second occasion late in 1950, it would have been difficult to explain to any fighting soldier that reinforcements were available and on the way. The soldiers knew that anything that could be done would have to be done by those already present. There were no units to be spared and as for replacements, the first draftees inducted after the start of that conflict would not complete their training until the end of January 1951.(7) It is true that what was done was magnificent, but this situation left much to be desired.

Still, good fortune reigned with the United States, but what happens when good fortune runs out? Can we continue to enjoy the luxury of our geographical location? Are we ready to assist our Allies as we have so committed ourselves? The answer is obviously no.

We have seen the need to take some steps for National Security by setting up programs for economic mobilization, for a sound intelligence system and for research and development

(7) New York Times, "Marshall Warns U.S. of Risk of Draft Lag", p.8, 26 Jan 1951, TIS Library.

to mention a few. All of these combined programs only serve to form "the base of a pyramid", the "apex" being a sound program for universal military training.(8) Our National Security cannot be complete without this "apex" and this "apex" cannot be complete without its forming a thoroughly trained, instantly ready and highly mobile force. It must defy any challenge by any aggressor. We must realize that weakness invites extermination. In building this strong "apex" we must at all times consider the capabilities of the forces which threaten to break it down. After careful consideration and analysis of those forces, we do not find it necessary nor feasible to mold the "apex" of a huge regular military force. However, it is necessary and possible to build it by mixing a striking element with a large reserve element. This can be accomplished through our regular and reserve establishments.

Attempts have been made in the past to build the "apex" by maintaining strictly volunteer regular and reserve forces.(9) History has proven this plan will not work. Whenever hostilities broke out, our regular forces were small and poorly equipped. Our reserves could not be considered effective except to form cadres for training personnel.

The only way that effective military forces and, subsequently, adequate National Security, can be maintained is through a system of compulsory universal military training.

- (8) Report of the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training, "A Program For National Security", p.30, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1947, TIS Library.
- (9) Army Information Digest, "Army Manpower Requirements", p.17, Feb 1947, TIS Library.

This has been attempted several times by the introduction of bills into Congress.(10) Finally, in June 1951, a bill was passed and signed by our President providing a law which agrees in principle to this system of training.(11) This law calls for the establishment of a National Security Training Corps. Upon activation (this must be approved by Congress) this Corps is authorized to induct all persons between the ages of eighteen and nineteen years. All persons inducted shall be trained for a period of six months. All training will be of a military nature and during the training the trainees would receive thirty dollars per month. The law further calls for death and disability benefits, a code of conduct and regulates overseas assignment. Although this law contains many provisions which are satisfactory, it is still far from adequate. Any law, which falls short in accomplishing the purpose for which it is enacted, is inadequate.

In considering a law for a program of this type, we must always keep two things in mind, our ultimate objective and the feasibility of such a program. Our ultimate objective is, as was previously stated, to establish a thoroughly trained, highly mobile, instantly ready force to retaliate instantly against any or all aggressor attacks. A feasible program is simply a program within reason, one which is practicable and possible.

In combining the two, we mix what must be done with what

- (10) Fitzpatrick, E. A., "Universal Military Training", p.22, McGraw-Hill Book Co., N.Y., 1945, TIS Library.
(11) Marx, H.L., Jr., "Universal Conscription for Essential Service", p.38, E.W. Wilson Co., N.Y., 1951, Post Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

can we do, and, in substance, come up with this solution. Every man between the ages of eighteen and nineteen years must serve a total of eight obligated years. One year must be served on active duty in one of the Armed Forces. The remaining seven years must be spent in the reserves (National Guard, one of the Organized Reserve components, entry into ROTC at one of our universities or entrance into a service academy).

Under this plan, it will be necessary to conscript all able-bodied men for the one year active service. It is felt that this one year service is necessary for many reasons.

First, it would strengthen our regulars or striking force, which, during peacetime, have needed bolstering. Under this plan approximately eight hundred thousand men would be inducted into the services annually. The first six months would be spent on a thorough individual training and team training phase (Team training phase for the Army and Marines would be a unit training phase, for the Navy, a touch of sea duty on board a ship and for the Air Force, ground school with maybe a limited amount of flying). The remainder of the year would find these individuals welded into units as effective fighting teams. The changeover from one phase to another would be gradual and progressive. At the end of the first six months, all individuals would be able to perform their jobs. The last six months would be spent on more thorough training and developing added proficiency. There are less casualties in a group of well trained soldiers than in groups having lesser training. These fighting teams will be led by trained and proven leaders from reserve volunteers

on extended active duty and from the regulars.

Next, this plan would help provide needed leaders for the services. During the later period of training those showing leadership qualities can be developed, trained and receive experience.

We must also consider a year induction period because of the advancement in weapons. With rapid research and development we have weapons which are more complex than any of the past. To become proficient with these new weapons requires more training than was necessary a few years ago.

Although many of the regulars would be occupied in the training of inducted personnel, it is felt that the strength necessary could be maintained through the desire of trained inductees to remain on active duty. Not only would the necessary level be maintained, but the standards for enlistment could be raised. Inductees who found that they were adapted to military life would also find it appealing. They would realize that their ability, if applied, would get them ahead in something they enjoyed. This would do away with those undeserving individuals in the services who are satisfied to "sign up" in order to eat, sleep and draw a few dollars each payday for a minimum amount of work. This class of individual is not common, but there are some.

If this program is planned properly four hundred thousand persons would always be in the basic and unit training phases and four hundred thousand would always be in the ready phase. These forces, along with those organized wholly by regulars would form our needed striking force. This would give us a team with sufficient power to engage an aggressor force in-

stantly, contain him and keep him occupied during the organization of our reinforcements or reserves.

At the end of the active service period an individual would revert to a reserve status. This, too, must be given careful consideration. Our reserves of the past have been nothing to brag about when it came to being ready for combat. They had little or no equipment, they were far understrength and they were poorly trained. Another situation which existed was poor leadership in many cases. Due to "politics", key positions in these military organizations were held by unqualified persons. It is recognized that the civilian populace must supervise and govern the military, but to be actively engaged in the operations is out of the question. Because a man is a good architect does not mean that he is a good contractor, plumber or carpenter. The problem of strength of our reserves would be supplied by the personnel reverting back from active service. The problem of training and equipment is currently undergoing changes and additional plans are now undergoing study. The men received by the reserves would be well trained to begin with. The training and equipment must be kept up-to-date because with the rapid research and development these organizations may well become obsolete.

If this program is conducted properly, it would be possible, within a few years, to call on the reserves and have them activated and ready to move in a very few days. Some may consider this unrealistic, but other nations have found this possible by putting it to a test. This, then,

forms the reinforcements necessary for the striking force. They would be strong, trained, equipped and ready for action in a matter of days instead of months or years as in the past.

In considering the facts thusfar, we find that we can now achieve the ultimate purpose of universal military training. Now, we must consider the program for feasibility.

The first consideration is the financial cost and can we afford such a program. Admittedly, the cost would be substantial, but compared with the cost of total mobilization from "scratch" in the event of war, it would appear as a paltry sum. It is estimated that the cost of the National Security Training Corps now authorized, would be two and one quarter percent of the cost of six months of World War II.(12) Accordingly then, this proposed plan, doubling the length of active service, would cost less than five percent. There have been claims that universal military training program carried on outside of the military services would save untold millions of dollars. It is difficult to understand how any difference could occur except in the pay of individuals. This pay could be so altered if desired. If this great difference does occur, the estimates for civilian type universal training are far from accurate or the efficiency of the military should be investigated thoroughly.

The second consideration is can we carry out such a program without seriously interfering with education. No one would be inducted until after high school and anyone desiring to further his education could certainly do so after the com-

(12) Army Information Digest, "Universal Military Training", p.29, Feb 1947, TIS Library.

pletion of the active service period. Some colleges have already agreed to alter their programs if necessary to assist in this respect.

Another consideration is the effect of this program on industrial manpower. In answer to this, approximately ten million men were in uniform during World War II and the country's production was still great.

There are other considerations which bear watching such as the effects of training on our nation's youth and the possibility of our becoming a "militaristic" nation, but if the training is governed and supervised properly there would be little concern.

This analysis, then, finds that this program is feasible. It can be accomplished without undue hardship and any hardship imposed could not be considered other than patriotic duty.

It fulfills the primary requisites necessary for adequate military manpower preparedness.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the plan outlined herein offers the only honest, equitable method of providing for adequate military manpower for sound National Security.

This plan would prevent reoccurrences of unpreparedness as in our situation at the beginning of World War II and the Korean conflict. The price our country paid on those occasions was almost immeasurable. With this plan we would no longer fear those losses in men or money. We would possess a ready, trained and mobile force which could retaliate instantly against any attempt of aggression either at home or abroad.

This plan would do away with the committment of limited numbers of Americans without immediate reinforcements and replacements.

The cost of this plan could be borne over a number of years and would not involve the risk of this country going bankrupt in the event of another great war.

This plan would provide a "training plant", if needed, for even greater numbers of persons in our forces. This would save time in training. We may recall that those first inducted after we were committed in Korea did not complete training until January 1951 - over six months later. In that month only five thousand replacements were turned out. Time could be saved and a greater number of replacements could be turned out with the activation of this plan.

This plan would insure that every American would carry his rightful share of the load for our security. This has not

been true in the past. Since the beginning of the Korean conflict, for example, approximately eight hundred thousand veterans have been recalled to active duty. For the majority of those recalled, this was their second war while others still had not seen their first.

This plan would insure our position in world leadership. Those who are weak find themselves not always able to demand respect.

The time saved in mobilization of this nation under this plan is time, money and men that wishful thinking could never replace. In speaking of time and preparedness in the event of war, General Eisenhower, our next President, stated, "The decision in a future war would be determined by our ability to act and react in the first sixty days".(13)

The last conclusion is, if this plan were adopted, it would defy the challenge of any aggressor. Strength, in this case, invites peace. Weakness invites disaster. As von Clausewitz so ably stated, "Formerly fortresses were only built for the defense and protection of the inhabitants. This use of fortresses has been too little regarded in modern times. If there was a country in which not only all great and rich cities, but all populaces as well, were fortified and defended by inhabitants, the talent as well as the force of the enemy's General would sink to nothing".(14)

(13) Baldwin, H.W., "The Price of Power", p.273, Harper and Brothers, N.Y., 1947, TIS Library.

(14) Military Review, "Clausewitz and the Cold War", p.76, Jan 1952, TIS Library.

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